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Abstract
The article examines the extent to which latecomers to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) that comprise more than 
one half of the organization could be said to have contributed 
to the establishment of the International Labour Code, about two 
thirds of which had already been established by the time that 
they began to join the ILO as politically sovereign independent 
states. The article focuses on the recent work of the ILO 
Working Party on Policy Regarding the Revision of Standards 
(1994-2002). It evaluates both the significance of outcomes of 
the Working Party’s achievements and the role of the latecomers 
in that enterprise. It shows that the latecomers have 
appropriated the ILO dynamic and utilized the ILO’s Working 
Party and Committee structures both to project matters of 
foremost concern to themselves onto the agenda of the ILO and to 
update the International Labour Code by evaluating, 
categorizing, and suspending some of the Conventions and 
Recommendations that they had deemed to be irrelevant. It 
concludes that after the conclusion of the work of the Working 
Party on Policy Regarding the Revision of Standards, latecomers 
to the ILO have become equal co-authors and co-owners of the 
International Labour Code together with all the other member 
states parties of the ILO.
I. Introduction
The province of international law has amplified and displaced 
the Austinian handicap, which previously begged the question of 
whether international law was in fact law.1 However, an 
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unyielding band of its detractors appear to be congregating now 
under the charge that international law is international only in 
name but Western centric in practice. They argue that it is 
created by Western states for the pursuit and service of Western 
interests. For this reason, it could neither command the 
universal appeal that is implied in its title of “international 
law” nor service genuinely international concerns. They conclude 
that therefore, the labeling of what is essentially Western 
oriented law as international law diminishes both the symbolic 
validation of the standards at issue and the legitimacy of the 
international legal system in general because of the apparent 
contrast between international law’s own purpose and its 
practice. One way of correcting this would be to represent 
international law consistently with its origin, purpose, focus, 
and pursuit. Another would be to renew international law 
altogether so that all of its stakeholders are seen to be co-
authors and co-owners of its code and its practice. The 
International Labour Organisation has gone for the latter 
approach.
This article examines and evaluates the ILO’s recent effort 
to renew its International Labour Code of 185 Conventions and 
195 Recommendations2--the majority of which had been concluded by 
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the mid-1960s when through the United Nations decolonization 
program Western colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
began to join the ILO as sovereign independent states. These 
former colonies, which comprise more than one-half of the ILO 
membership of 180 countries,3 had played no part in the creation 
of nearly two-thirds of the current International Labour Code. 
The article shows that through work of the ILO Working Party on 
Policy Regarding the Revision of Standards (1994-2002)4 the ILO 
has transformed and renewed its labor code in a way that has 
enabled latecomers to the organization to fully appropriate its 
standards. Without these “renewal-seeking interventions” these 
latecomers to the ILO would have remained objects of the 
International Labour Code in spite of them numbering more than 
one-half of the organization’s membership. The previous 
situation would have become increasingly unsustainable because 
of the ILO’s uniqueness among other international organizations 
and also for reasons of authenticity and legitimacy. 
A. Uniqueness of the ILO
The ILO is unique among the institutions, organs and specialized 
agencies of the UN family in two ways. It is the only surviving 
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institution created by the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919) and 
is widely acknowledged to have inspired the procedures and 
principles of both the UN (1945) and the UDHR (1948). The ILO 
has elected the setting of international labor policy and 
standards, and the provision of technical assistance to states 
as the principal means of pursuing its mission--pursuit of 
social justice for all.5 It is the only organization that is 
governed by the principles of universality and tripartism–the 
ILO dynamic. Its mission and dynamic recommend equal 
participation of member states parties in its procedures, 
especially standard setting.
As a policy, tripartism requires that all stakeholders 
within and between nation states engage in social dialogue 
whenever matters referring to policy and standard setting are 
under consideration. In other words, no policy change could be 
inaugurated or effected, or new standards developed without the 
participation at both national and international levels of the 
governments’, employers’, and workers’ representatives. 
ILO standards are universal in that they create obligations 
even for member states parties that have not yet ratified them. 
This is a novel departure from general international law, which 
does not recognize any legal obligations for a State viz an 
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international treaty that the State has not ratified,6 except the 
requirement that states should refrain from acts that may be 
inconsistent with the object and purpose of treaties that they 
have signed up to. 
This is achieved through Article 19 of the ILO Constitution 
(1919) which obliges member states to submit to their competent 
authority, in principle the legislative assembly, all 
Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the ILO Conference 
“for the enactment of legislation or other action” within a 
period of twelve to eighteen months. The idea is to ensure 
national public debate on the issues referred to in ILO 
instruments with a view to promoting their implementation. Since 
the amendment of the ILO Constitution in 1946, member states 
parties are also required under Article 19 to submit periodic 
reports to the ILO, on the position of their law and practice in 
regard to the matters dealt with in the Conventions that they 
have not ratified and in Recommendations of the ILO Conference. 
These two requirements give the ILO a unique standards 
policy in an international legal system that is premised on 
consent-based treaty obligations. This policy was enhanced by 
the adoption in 1998 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work.7 The Declaration cemented member 
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states’ obligations to ILO principles by committing them to 
recognize, promote, protect, and ensure respect for the dignity 
of individuals qua human beings in specific areas regardless of 
a State’s  level of economic development and regardless of 
whether a State had previously ratified the relevant 
Conventions. Covered areas include freedom of association and 
the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced or 
compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor and the 
elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. 
Although the universal jurisdiction of ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations applies only to member states parties of the 
ILO, the fact that more than one-half of the organization’s 
membership had not been involved in the creation of almost two-
thirds of the current International Labour Code justified 
questions about authorship and ownership of international labor 
law. It would raise questions about the fitness of the ILO for 
its mission to secure social justice as a means of facilitating 
international peace and security particularly because the status 
quo gave an appearance of discrimination in the allocation of 
responsibility amongst its membership.
B. Authenticity of the ILO
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David Miller defines social justice as that which people 
generally conceive to encapsulate fairness and justice. “[S]ocial 
justice has always been, and must always be, a critical idea, 
one that challenges us to reform our institutions and practices 
in the name of greater fairness.”8 Seniority in  membership of 
the ILO alone can never be a sufficient justification for the 
manifest unequal exercise of power by states in the authorship 
of the International Labour Code. Therefore, the insistence upon 
a labor code, two-thirds of which had been established by the 
time that latecomers that form more than one-half of the ILO’s 
membership joined up was always going to be difficult because of 
its appearance of unfairness. 
While it could be argued that latecomers to the ILO might 
have been attracted to the organization by its norms, and 
therefore, that there was nothing wrong with the status quo, the 
reverse could also be argued with similar force. That is, that 
some states parties might have joined the organization for other 
reasons, including the quest to use the ILO procedure and 
purpose as a tool for the pursuit of other goals not yet listed 
or prioritized by the ILO. For this reason the focus should be 
on whether the upholding of the status quo enhances or 
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diminishes the legitimacy of the International Labour Code. 
Franck defines legitimacy as a rule or the system’s pull of its 
addressees towards compliance.9 The greater the legitimacy, the 
stronger the pull and vice versa. In this sense states’ 
perceptions of legitimacy and of social justice have the 
potential to determine the efficacy of the International Labour 
Code.
II. Origin, Purpose and Pursuits of the ILO
Socially, the idea to establish common minimum labor standards 
was provoked by both ethical and economic concerns over the 
human cost of the Industrial Revolution back in the early 
nineteenth century. The status quo increasingly became 
unacceptable on humanitarian grounds as the maximum working 
hours per day and week, the provision of an adequate living 
wage, the protection of workers against ill health arising out 
of their employment, the recognition of the principle that work 
of equal value required equal remuneration, the protection of 
migrant workers, and other issues became paramount.10 The end of 
the first World War viewed the social injustices in and arising 
out of employment practice as some of the biggest threats to 
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lasting international peace and security.11 
Formally, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) provided for the 
creation of the International Labour Organisation for the 
purpose of attending the existing conditions of labor that 
evidenced “such injustice, hardship, and privation to large 
numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace 
and harmony of the world are imperilled.”12 Considerations of 
humanity and fear of unfair competition galvanized the 
commitment to secure a universal social policy for the global 
world of work. To achieve this ideal the ILO would have to 
become an information-processing center. Enormous, exact, and 
comparable information would need to be collated and processed 
and then applied to the standard setting initiative--the ILO’s 
principal mode of pursuing its objectives. The first Director-
General of the ILO, Albert Thomas13 wondered in what directions, 
and up to what precise point, such legislation could be 
instituted and applied. 
By what methods--uniform or diverse--can the same standard 
of life, conditions of labour equally humane, the same 
dignity for the wage-earner in his work, be secured at the 
same time in industry, in commerce, in transport and in 
agriculture? In what measure, . . . is the careful 
consideration of “differences of climate, habits and 
customs, of economic opportunity, and industrial tradition” 
consistent with progress towards more nearly uniform 
conditions of labour, which is one of the chief concerns of 
the [ILO]? . . . Finally, how far can international control 
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be harmonised with national sovereignty?
The Gompers Commission14 comprising representatives from nine 
Western nations, namely the United Kingdom, the United States 
France, Italy, Japan, Cuba, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland] 
wrote the constitutive document of the ILO sometime between 
January and April 1919. Albert Thomas writes that the idea was 
to create a permanent international organization that would 
establish humane conditions of labor and institute and apply 
everywhere a system of international labor legislation subject 
to reservations imposed by the sovereignty of each state and the 
conditions prevailing therein.15 
The “purpose jurisdiction” of the organization also 
encapsulated African, Asian, South American, and other workers, 
especially those under colonial domination. The “subject 
jurisdiction” of the ILO, that is, inhuman conditions of labor 
resulting in injustice, hardship, and privation also included 
African, Asian, South American, and other workers especially 
because of the effects of colonialism. Their colonial masters 
could not morally be relied upon to ensure humane conditions for 
employees. Therefore, the subject and purpose jurisdictions of 
the ILO generated legitimate expectations of the organization 
among all those that grasped the remit of the organization. 
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Among these was Pope Paul VI who called for the genuine 
internationalization of international labor law.16 But did the 
organization itself grasp the idea?
A. Development of ILO Standards in the First Forty Years
In the first forty years of its existence the ILO concentrated 
on developing and enforcing international labor standards that 
sought to improve working conditions for large numbers of 
people. The priority areas were listed as 
the regulation of the hours of work . . . , the prevention 
of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, 
the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and 
injury arising out of employment the protection of 
children, young persons and women, provision for old age 
and injury, protection of [workers employed abroad] . . . 
[and] recognition of the principle of freedom of 
association.17 
In the first twenty years sixty-seven conventions and 
sixty-six recommendations were adopted. They included 
conventions on indigenous peoples, which specifically targeted 
the welfare of those in dependent territories or colonies.18 
However, the Great Depression19 compelled an adjustment in the 
focus of the organization to that of the quality of employment. 
In 1934, the United States, which was not a member of the 
League of Nations, became a member state party of the ILO. The 
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election of United States David Morse to the office of Director-
General of the ILO in 1948 coincided with the renewed 
development of the ILO’s work on labor standards and the launch 
of its technical cooperation scheme.20 
Post World War II conventions focused on human rights and 
more technical labor issues. Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association was adopted in 1948, to establish the ILO’s most 
fundamental democratic right in the world of work. A special 
tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has 
assisted with more than 2000 cases in the last five decades.21
However, it was not until after the World War II, and then 
only after the swinging into action of the decolonization 
program under the UN Trusteeship Council, that former Western 
colonies began to take up membership of the ILO in sufficiently 
significant numbers to affect directly the policy and norm 
development programs of the ILO. Prior to that these former 
colonies do not appear to have had any real opportunity directly 
to participate in the ILO’s norm creating endeavors even though 
their predicament of colonial subjugation and servitude was 
typical of the sort of situation that the purpose jurisdiction 
of the ILO targeted. To date, none of the seven Director-
Generals of the organization has come from Africa. In fact the 
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only non-Western Director-General has been Chile’s Juan Somavia 
who took office in March of 1999.
Nonetheless, it is an idea’s appeal rather than the 
personality of its messenger that determines its success or 
failure. Great ideas always surprise even their most ambitious 
optimists by assuming a life of their own that goes well beyond 
the expectations of even their surest advocates. The core values 
of the ILO, namely freedom, humanitarianism, social justice, and 
peace building gave the organization enormous universal appeal 
especially because of the ubiquitous prevalence of social 
injustice. It is this prevalence of social injustice that has 
prompted and institutionalized as visionaries people such as 
Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, William 
Wilberforce, and others. Their examples remind us continually of 
the need to work towards social justice and to guard against 
complacency in the cause of freedom and human rights protection 
for all. 
Humanitarianism targets the promotion, protection, and 
preservation of the inherent dignity of every human being while 
social justice seeks either to limit or, knock out from society 
unfairness that hinders self-actualisation of any human being. 
Peace is the matrix on which the human condition thrives the 
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best. Whatever differences nations may have one with another 
they will always find, if they search, that the core values of 
the ILO are timeless and have a universal appeal. 
The millions of Africans that suffered as a result of the 
slave trade between 1502 when African slaves were first reported 
in the New World, and 1833, when the practice was formally 
abolished, would argue that the ILO was the organization that 
their time desperately needed but did not have. ILO values are 
as attractive today as they have ever been. It is not surprising 
that the purpose and subject jurisdictions of the ILO had 
destined the organization with a universal appeal right from the 
start. 
To be sure, international law’s legitimacy would be less 
problematic if states enjoyed equal opportunity to moot, purvey 
and enforce its values and standards. However, there must be a 
higher ideal than that of equality of authorship in institution 
building, standard setting and practice thereof. That must be 
the self-evident equality of access to ownership of manifestly 
universal principles that offer the best hope for actualisation 
of human dignity. It is settled that mere existence of a 
constitution, however comprehensive and elegant, is simply 
promissory until people know and understand its provisions, have 
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faith that their governments will not overrule it, and believe 
that their rights as promulgated within it, will indeed be 
upheld.22 
Member states parties’ contribution to the development of 
the International Labour Code is measurable in two ways. The 
first is by examining the extent to which latecomers to the ILO 
have voluntarily appropriated as their own, the ILO’s purposes, 
promises and aspirations for a free, just, equal, and peaceful 
world. The second is by evaluating the ILO’s reaction to this 
appropriation and the dynamic fostered between latecomers to the 
ILO and the organization as a result of that reaction. For 
latecomers to the ILO to be said to have sufficiently 
appropriated ILO processes and procedures it must be shown that 
a change in the normative standards and/or, standards policy of 
the ILO had occurred that was either: 
(a) Attributable to the involvement of latecomers with the 
organization. It would have to be shown that but for the 
participation of these latecomers to the organization, the 
organization might not have evolved such new standards or 
practice--extreme appropriation; or
(b)  Attributable to the participation of latecomers in 
common concert with other member States of the 
organization. It would have to be shown that but for the 
instigation or significant influence of latecomers in the 
organization, the organization might not have evolved such 
new standards or practice--full appropriation.23
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III. ILO Committee Strategy 
The establishment of the Working Party on Policy Regarding the 
Revision of Standards (1994-2002)24 is typical of ILO working 
practice because much of the work of the ILO on standard setting 
is conducted in committees of the tripartite ILO Governing Body, 
the executive body of the International Labour Office. The ILO 
Governing Body takes serious decisions on ILO policy, decides 
the agenda of the International Labour Conference, adopts the 
draft program and budget of the organization for submission to 
the ILO Conference, and elects the Director-General of the ILO. 
Therefore, to address adequately the question of whether these 
latecomers to the ILO have made a contribution to the creation 
of the International Labour Code and to its enforcement 
procedures, we must also examine their involvement in and effect 
on the work of ILO Governing Body Committees.
The Governing Body has six committees.25 Their functions 
vary from enforcing or monitoring states compliance with their 
obligations under the International Labour Code; advising the 
ILO Governing body on technical issues such as entering into 
treaties with other legal entities, determining both the 
efficiency and coherency of the international labour code and 
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its enforcement strategies; to mere planning and tying up of 
loose ends in the organization’s activities. In addition to 
these committees, the ILO Governing Body may establish working 
parties to oversee specific tasks. The ILO Working Party on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization (WP/SDG) was established in 
November of 1994 specifically as a forum for the discussion of 
all matters relating to the topic.26 It immediately set itself in 
1995 the task of assisting in making the corpus of international 
labour standards more operational and “readable.”27
The CFA was established at the 117th session of the 
Governing Body in 1951 for the purpose of monitoring states 
parties’ compliance with their Constitutional and Convention 
obligations on the right to organize. It comprises nine members, 
three from each of the three groups of government, worker, and 
employer representatives and chaired by an independent expert. 
On 26, 27 May and 3 June 2005, the committee met under the 
Chairmanship of Professor Paul van Heijden in Geneva. In 120 
cases before the committee the governments complained against 
were requested to submit their observations. The committee 
examined the merits of thirty-five of these cases and reached 
definitive conclusions in 22 and interim conclusions in 
thirteen. The remaining cases were adjourned.28
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The Programme, Financial and Administrative Committee (PFA) 
is responsible for financial and general administrative matters 
and for personnel questions. The Committee on Employment and 
Social Policy (ESP) is an advisory body. It advises the ILO 
Governing Body on ILO policies and activities in such areas as 
employment, training, enterprise development and cooperatives, 
industrial relations and labour administration, working 
conditions and environment, and social security. 
The Committee on Sectoral and Technical Meetings and 
Related Issues (STM) has a managerial function, assisting the 
ILO Governing Body with preparatory, planning, and follow up 
issues in ILO sectoral committees and meetings, ILO technical 
meetings, meetings of experts and the review of the ILO Sectoral 
Activities Programme and ILO sectoral and technical meetings. 
The Committee on Technical Cooperation (TC) is an advisory body. 
It advises the Governing Body on matters relating to ILO 
technical cooperation programs under all sources of funding. 
The Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour 
Standards (LILS) has numerous substantive and procedural 
responsibilities. They include consideration of matters relating 
to Standing Orders; standard setting and procedures, including 
the approval of report forms for ILO Conventions and 
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Recommendations and the selection of instruments for Article 19 
reporting; and ensuring the recognition, promotion and 
protection of human rights, especially anti-discrimination 
obligations of states. At its 262nd Session in March/April 1995 
the ILO Governing Body approved the establishment of a working 
party under the LILS, specifically to address the possibility of 
reviewing of ILO standards--the Working Party on Policy 
regarding the Revision of Standards (WP/PRS). This followed 
discussions on standard-setting policy at the International 
Labour Conference in 1994. The WP/PRS was established for the 
specific purpose of:
1. Determining the actual revision needs of the 
international labour code; 
2. Formulating the criteria that could be applied in the 
effort to revise the international labour code the 
revision of standards; 
3. Studying the international labour code to determine 
areas where evaluation of standards may be needed; 
4. Ensuring coherency in the standard-setting system 
procedures; analysing the difficulties and obstacles 
involved in the ratification of ILO Conventions; 
5. Suggesting the measures for improving the ratification 
of Conventions that have been revised.29 
Because the majority of the International Labour Code was 
already in place when latecomers began to take up membership of 
the ILO, they could be said to be aliens to the code that 
regulates them. However, the purposes of the LILS and in 
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particular its WP/PRS could be said to have presented late 
arrivals at the ILO with the opportunity to streamline the 
International Labour Code through the revision of its standards. 
If it succeeded this project would make these late arrivals co-
authors and co-owners of the international labour code. But this 
could only happen if the late arrivals to the ILO, including 
African, Asian, South American and other states actually engaged 
these ILO bodies for that purpose. The LILS’ meetings are 
private and the committee is comprised of sixteen government 
members (four from each region), eight employer members and 
eight worker members.
IV. The Latecomers and the ILO’s Standard Revision Process
The First Session of the ILO Conference held in October 1919 in 
Washington, DC adopted six Conventions and six Recommendations. 
They dealt with issues that were prioritized either as urgent, 
or as mature and included hours of work in industry, 
unemployment, night work of women, maternity protection, and 
minimum age for admission to employment and night work of young 
persons in industry. This was a record setting achievement among 
international organisations regarding the rapidity in the 
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accumulation of conventions and recommendations. This raised the 
question of quality, efficacy, and potential longevity of the 
standards created. In acknowledgment of this the ILO adopted in 
1922 the double discussion procedure (DDP)30 as a means of 
ensuring depth and breath in the formulation of the 
International Labour Code. 
The procedure requires that a technical committee consider 
over two sessions (usually consecutive) the proposed new 
standards. In spite of this, the ILO also realized that the 
dynamism that is both inherent and typical of the labor market 
means that their standards quickly and easily can become 
incongruous to the new character or subtleties of the mischief 
that they were intended to address. To deal with this threat, 
the ILO introduced into the Standing Orders of the Governing 
Body in 1928 a specific procedure for the revision of 
Conventions. This was followed in 1929 by the introduction into 
the Standing Orders of the ILO Conference, a specific procedure 
for the revision of the labor code. 
The 1929 procedure was successfully applied for the first 
time in 1931 to deal with concerns that certain technical 
provisions of the Convention were holding states parties from 
ratifying the instrument. This achieved the revision of 
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Convention No. 28 (1929) on the Protection Against Accidents for 
Dock Workers.31 One effect of the “revisionist strategy” is that 
it helps ensure that ILO standards remain relevant to the 
constantly moving and changing labor environment. It keeps check 
on the mischief previously dealt with in earlier Conventions. 
The “Convention revision strategy” has been dormant since. This 
could be a result of one of two things. 
The first possible explanation for this dormancy is that 
other strategies have been established that are more efficient 
and more suited to the task. One example is the generation of 
efficient standards at the outset. The generation of 
sufficiently broad, profound, and efficient standards that cater 
to the immediate, medium and long term aspects effects of the 
mischief sought to be regulated reduces the need for revising 
ILO standards. 
A second possible explanation for the dormancy of the 
standard revision exercise is that the ILO has deliberately 
decided to “switch off” those of its mechanisms that might 
empower late-comers to the organization over their senior 
partners in the organization--a strategy that has worked 
elsewhere in the UN.
For instance, during the cold war era the Western states 
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had the practice of decisively settling in the UN General 
Assembly major policy issues that appeared to be in the 
jurisdiction of the Security Council. That practice circumvented 
the potential deployment of the veto power by the other 
permanent member states of the Security Council. That all 
changed with the granting of political independence to former 
colonial states who soon assumed a majority in the UN General 
Assembly. With votes determined on a majority system as opposed 
to consensus, Western states switched discussion of all major, 
critical, and policy issues to the Security Council. 
Continued discussion and resolution in the UN General 
Assembly of any such major, critical and policy issues in 
international law would have empowered the newly independent 
states, something that the West was not prepared to do, ready to 
do, or will ever do. However, the latter analogy does not fit 
with both the vision and practice of the ILO.32 This leaves us 
with the view that other ILO strategies that are more suitably 
placed and more efficient have emerged and superseded the DDP. 
Besides, the revision of Conventions invariably raises the 
issue of the consequences33 of the coexistence of several or 
multiple texts on the same issue. That is also inconsistent with 
one of the objects and purposes of the ILO, namely, to institute 
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a universal, uniform labor code that serves as “chief co-
ordinator of social policy” on the one hand and as “fair 
economic competition curator” among states on the other. The co-
existence of multiple conventions within the International 
Labour Code would cease to be an issue if all previous 
Conventions were regarded as interim or intermediate objectives 
for states that wished to ensure protection of the values at 
issue but not yet ready to go all the way--progressive analysis.
The falsity of this argument lies in that it assumes that 
successive Conventions merely up the threshold of sufficiency in 
the protection of the values at issue without altering either 
the values themselves or even their content. Revision of norms 
can target either or both the values and their content, and also 
the recognition and threshold criteria. In such cases the 
progressive analysis fails. 
Could a repeal of the earlier Convention(s) resolve the 
issue of inconsistency in the labor code? Conventions or 
Treaties are the only way that states purposively create legally 
binding obligations with one another under international law. In 
this sense, Treaties or Conventions raise contractual 
obligations for involved states. Consequently, the ILO could not 
revise the obligations arising for states therefrom. 
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To deal with this issue the ILO Conference voted in June 
1997 to amend the ILO Constitution by adding a ninth paragraph 
to Article 19.34 It provides that:
Acting on a proposal of the Governing Body, the Conference 
may, by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the 
delegates present, abrogate any Convention adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of this article if it 
appears that the Convention has lost its purpose or that it 
no longer makes a useful contribution to attaining the 
objectives of the Organisation.35
This provision was intended to institute the ILO Convention 
abrogation mechanism, that would be invoked where the activities 
covered by a Convention no longer existed or where the 
Convention no longer served any purpose. A two-thirds majority 
vote of delegates attending the International Labour Conference 
would ensure that. However, the amendment has not come into 
force. It has yet to secure the required minimum number of 
ratifications. 
Therefore, the ILO has had to adopt other strategies for 
keeping its labor code consistent with modern day requirements. 
In this connection the ILO Governing Body has adopted the 
strategy of creating revising Conventions that replace older 
ones, and protocols, which add new provisions to older 
Conventions. The protocols create new voluntary obligations for 
ratifying states. States that do not ratify the protocols still 
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must report to the ILO the action that they have taken to ensure 
Protocol standards. Nonetheless, the replacement of standards is 
more flexible than revising them because the former enables the 
creation of more far-reaching standards than the latter.36 The 
ILO Governing Body’s Committee on LILS and its WP/PRS have 
played a major role in the updating of ILO standards. 
Within the first eight years of the creation of the WP/PRS 
all ILO standards adopted before 1985, save the Fundamental and 
Priority Conventions, were reviewed for their efficacy.37 The 
review concluded that seventy-one Conventions--including the 
Fundamental Conventions and all those Conventions adopted after 
1985--were “up-to-date” and recommended their active promotion. 
The remaining ones either needed to be revised, abrogated, or 
studied further. What role, if any, have the latecomer states 
played in reaching these decisions?
A. Latecomers and the ILO Working Party on Policy Regarding 
the Revision of Standards 
The Working Party was a sub-committee of the LILS Committee. 
Although the Working Party no longer exists, its work is still 
being followed up through LILS.38 The Working Party39 began its 
26
work in November 1995 and finished in March 2002. It comprised 
thirty-two members as follows: sixteen government members (four 
from each region,) eight employer members, and eight worker 
members.40 Its meetings were held in private.
The privacy attached to the proceedings hampers discovery 
of the actual positions taken during deliberations of the 
Working Party. Therefore, the effort of the WP/PRS could not be 
examined in a way that ascribed positions to individuals or the 
states that they represented. Moreover, ILO Reports on the 
proceedings of the Working Party’s deliberations simply refer to 
the positions adopted by each of the tripartite bodies, i.e. 
Workers’ representatives, employers’ representatives, and 
governments’ representatives as if members always adopt a 
partisan approach to their task. Assumptions of such unity are 
not realistic. 
Therefore, the reporting procedure adopted by the ILO for 
these purposes is difficult to justify and frustrating for 
anyone trying to discover the specific input of particular 
regions into the work of the WP/PRS. 
In addition, the independent status of both the workers’ 
and the employers’ representatives on the WP/PRS meant that they 
were not under instruction regarding the positions that they 
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took in the debates and in the votes that they cast. Therefore, 
one would expect there to be occasions when decisions of the 
WP/PRS did not so easily fall into the categories of workers 
representatives’ and employers’ representatives views. “Cross 
views” where some employers’ representatives were persuaded by 
the line advocated by workers’ representatives and vice versa 
are not discussed in the published reports, as if they never 
happened at all. However, the private nature of the proceedings 
of the WP/PRS safeguards the possibility of “cross views.” This 
private nature of the proceedings of the Working Party provides 
a fertile atmosphere for thorough, profound and objective 
examination of the issues. 
A victim of its own success, the Working Party was 
discontinued in 2002 because it had fulfilled its mission of 
rejuvenating and strengthening the standard-setting system.41 By 
then it had reviewed all ILO standards adopted before 1985, save 
the Fundamental and Priority Conventions.42 The review concluded 
among other things that seventy-one conventions, including the 
Fundamental Conventions and all those conventions adopted after 
1985 were “up-to-date” and recommended their active promotion. 
The remaining ones were recommended for revision or shelving. 
Two more conventions were designated for promotion following the 
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2004 International Labour Conference.43
The Governing Body reports chronicled the work and 
achievements of the Working Party.44 In June 2002, the newly 
elected Governing Body approved the reconstitution for the 
period 2002-2005 of all its committees and subcommittees, with 
the exception of the WP/PRS of its LILS.45 Whatever the actual 
contributions of latecomer states representatives on the Working 
Party, the ILO practice of collective responsibility for its 
committees and Working Parties means that no credit can be 
ascribed individually to members of these committees or to their 
regions. That means that overall the achievements and or 
failures of these organs are attributable to the organs 
themselves and not to their membership. 
Thus, latecomers’ involvement in the ILO objective of 
authoritatively updating the International Labour Code gave them 
co-editorial control over the whole of the labor code so that 
the end result could be said to be an international labour code 
that has been both co-authored and approved by all the four 
regions of the world through their representation in the Working 
Party. Consequently, this revised International Labour Code is 
co-owned also by latecomer states who in spite of taking up 
membership of the ILO very late in the day regarding the 
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establishment of the labor code, have engaged the committees and 
Working Parties of the ILO’s Governing Body in equal partnership 
with their African, American, Asian, and European counterparts 
to declare the authenticity of all the labor standards. 
In partnership with representatives from the other regions, 
latecomer state representatives on the WP/PRS endorsed the 
Fundamental and Priority Conventions of the ILO and placed them 
beyond revision. This categorized the standards referred to in 
those Conventions as immutable. 
The Fundamental Conventions are basic Conventions of the 
ILO, which are a precondition to all the others regardless of 
any distinguished variables in the economic, social, or 
political condition of states parties to the ILO. These eight 
Conventions relate to freedom of association, Convention No. 87 
(1948 and Convention No. 98 (1949); abolition of forced labour, 
Convention No. 29 (1930) and Convention No. 105 (1957); 
equality, Convention No. 111 (1958) and Convention No. 100 
(1951); and the elimination of child labor Convention No. 138 
(1973) and Convention No. 182 (1999).
The Priority Conventions are:
1. The Tripartite Consultation (International Labour 
Standards) Convention No. 144 (1976). The Convention seeks to 
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ensure effective consultation between the representatives of 
government, employers, and workers on international labor 
standards. This unique tripartite system of the ILO has fostered 
and maintained social dialogue among the core stakeholders in 
industrial relations within and among member states of the 
organization. It enables workers’ representatives and employers’ 
representatives to participate equally with those of governments 
in discussions and decision-making on issues of mutual concern.
2. The Labour Inspection Convention, No. 81 (1947) and 
its Protocol of 1995
3. The Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, No. 
129 (1969).
4. Conventions Nos. 81 and 129 oblige the maintenance of 
a system of labor inspection in industrial, commercial and 
agricultural workplaces. Such systems must operate to the 
standards set in these instruments. The Protocol extends the 
scope of Convention No. 81 to the non-commercial service sector.
5. The Employment Policy Convention, No. 122 (1964), 
which promotes full, productive and freely chosen employment. 
The Convention’s objective is to ensure that state pursue “an 
active policy designed to promote full employment with a view to 
stimulating economic growth and development, raising levels of 
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living, meeting manpower requirements and overcoming 
unemployment and underemployment.” Recommendation No. 122 
supplements the Convention.
In spite of precluding both the Fundamental and the 
Priority Conventions from their review process, the Working 
Party retained an interest in them both, reporting on the 
results of the campaign to encourage states to ratify and 
implement them. In its report of March 2000 on the follow-up 
action taken by the International Labour Office on previous 
recommendations of the Working Party, the Working Party observed 
a significant increase in the level of ratifications of the 
eight Fundamental Conventions.46 Twenty-nine new ratifications 
had been registered for the Priority Conventions since 1995 and 
seven of them in 1999. Since 1995, seventeen ratifications had 
been registered for Convention No. 44 on Tripartite Consultation 
(International Labour Standards) five of them in 1999. Africa, 
Latin America, Arab states, and Azerbaijan were listed as 
targets for a special promotional campaign for ratification of 
Convention No. 81 on labor inspection. 
This development cannot be attributed to one factor alone, 
but certainly, we should not discount the potential contribution 
of the regional seminars, lectures, and meetings organized by 
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the ILO in several places in 1999, including Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and the Dominican 
Republic and also in Turin, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and elsewhere to 
promote these elite standards. 
Following on from that the Working Party then reviewed the 
remaining Conventions except those established after 1985, which 
were considered to be both recent and current and therefore up 
to date. But as curator of the International Labour Code, the 
Working Party promoted these Conventions for ratification. The 
Working Party reports that between 1995 and 2000 those up to 
date Conventions attracted 86 new ratifications. It commends the 
committee of experts’ involvement in the promotional process by 
drawing governments’ attention to up to date instruments that 
they could ratify.47
The Working Party’s review process resulted in 
recommendations to the ILO Governing Body either to:
1) Defer review of Conventions until after further 
studies had been undertaken on the subject,48
2) Withdraw instruments that were obsolete because they 
had not come into force at all,49
3) Shelve instruments in the light of later Conventions 
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on the same topic,50 
4) Revise instruments, or51 
5) Replace them altogether. 
Instruments recommended for revision included Convention 
Nos. 153 (1979), 13 (1921), 27 (1929), 119 (1963), 127 (1967), 
136 (1971)--dealing with occupational safety and health; 3 
(1919), 103 (1952)--on maternity protection; 6 (1919), 79 
(1946), 90 (1948)--dealing with night work of children and young 
persons; and 16 (1921), 73 (1946)--on seafarers.52 
Updating Conventions is one task and getting states to 
implement them is another. Until the latter is achieved, 
accomplishments in the former task serve precious little value. 
States sometimes fail to execute in full the request to denounce 
previous Conventions while at the same time ratifying the new 
ones. 
In 2000 the Working Party determined that over fifty 
Conventions were out of date. The Governing Body then invited 
states to ratify the recent instrument while denouncing the 
corresponding previous one.53 This has resulted in denunciations 
that are not preceded or accompanied by ratifications of later 
instruments. In this sense, states have used the opportunity to 
limit their obligations to universal requirements under the ILO 
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constitution where they previously had more binding voluntary 
obligations that come with ratification. This is also because 
different Conventions carry different procedural requirements 
for disengagement. That can hinder the simultaneity envisaged by 
the Working Party regarding denunciation and ratification of the 
recent instrument. Moreover, ILO surveys show that revised 
Conventions do “not always attract[] a large number of 
ratifications, and in certain cases the older Conventions have 
remained in force.”54
In 2000 the Working Party follow-up report indicated that 
since it began its work eighty-four new ratifications of revised 
Conventions and 100 denunciations of outdated Conventions had 
been registered. Ninety of these denunciations had resulted 
directly from the ratification of revised Conventions or related 
to the ratification of a corresponding up to date Convention. 
Follow up meetings to ensure that the recommendations of the 
committee were given serious consideration are widely reported. 
This review procedure was repeated with Recommendations55 of the 
ILO.
V. Conclusions
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This article has shown that the ILO had already established 
almost two-thirds of the current labor standards by the time 
that latecomers to the organization had begun to take up 
membership. The majority of these latecomers to the ILO comprise 
former colonies of Western states. Because the ILO has adopted 
standard setting as the primary means of pursuing its mission of 
facilitating international peace and security by pursuing social 
justice, its Conventions are universally binding against its 
membership. The problem this created was that of authorship and 
ownership of that code by all of its membership since the code 
was equally binding upon them. 
It was curious that an organization that champions social 
justice, operates on the principle of universal application of 
its standards, and is premised on social dialogue that includes 
the three main stakeholders, namely, states, employers, and 
workers unions would persist with such a manifestly unfair 
arrangement. Through the work of the WP/PRS (1994-2002) 
latecomers to the ILO from all the four regions, namely, Africa, 
Asia, America, and Europe have become co-authors and co-owners 
of the International Labour Code.
This has been ensured by the participation on equal footing 
of the governments’ representatives, workers’ representatives 
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and employers’ representatives in the Working Party’s effort to 
determine and confirm: 
1) What the Fundamental and Priority ILO standards should 
be? 
2) What standards were inconsistent with current 
needs of the Organization in its effort to ensure that 
pursuit of economic progress (the economic factor) was 
tempered by considerations of social justice and human 
rights? (the social factor) 
3) What standards were in need of revision, shelving 
or replacement?
4) What standards needed further scrutiny before a 
decision could be taken on whether to shelve, revise 
or defer a decision?56
The Working Party ensured that the entire gamut of the 
International Labour Code had been audited when it was wound up 
in 2002. Its recommendations were followed through right up to 
the ILO Conference level where decisions to implement them were 
taken. It appears therefore, that latecomers to the ILO have 
become authentic co-authors and co-owners of the International 
Labour Code through the work of the WP/PRS (1994-2002). However, 
the reporting procedures of the ILO attribute deliberations of 
its organs to workers’ representatives and employers’ 
representatives. This hinders discovery of participants’ 
personal or regional contributions and underlines the universal 
ownership of outcomes rather than their personal or regional 
instigators. Perhaps other UN bodies that may be concerned to 
enhance the legitimacy of their standards and practice could 
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adopt the ILO renewal-seeking strategy to achieve that. Revising 
of standards and practice of international bodies so that they 
manifest equal authorship and ownership of the programs that 
they administer is consistent with international law’s cardinal 
principle of equality of states.
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